The Grand Patchwork

The Importance of Rational and Emotional Cognitive Styles

The Importance of Rational and Emotional Cognitive Styles

April, 2007

Abstract

Rational and intuitive cognitive styles were investigated using paranormal belief as a dependant variable because paranormal believers may tap into both in differing ways. Previous research had suggested that paranormal believers possess deficient rationalization skills. It was hypothesized that perhaps paranormal belief is a function of high intuitive thinking rather than a deficit in rationalization. It was also hypothesized that one dominant cognitive style, could affect proper utilization of another. A rational prime, intuitive prime and control group were used to test these hypotheses. Female undergraduate participants (N = 164) filled out questionnaires and completed tasks measuring both rational and intuitive cognitive style. An ANOVA that measured the difference between the groups on the rational measure was significant, but in the opposite direction as predicted. Regression analyses supported the hypothesis that paranormal belief is a function of intuitive cognitive style and showed that high creative/intuitive scores did predict paranormal belief more efficiently than low rationalization scores. Paranormal believers may be high in intuitive cognitive style, rather than deficient in rational cognition. The interpretation that the cognitive styles may be antagonistically organized was discussed, along with issues of finding and creating a balance between rational and intuitive.

 

 

The Importance of Equal Validation of Rational and Intuitive Cognitive Styles

The relationship between rational and intuitive cognitive styles is the focus of this investigation. Research on these two major cognitive styles and the relationship between them was explored for a full understanding of the two and how they may work together. Paranormal belief was used as a dependant variable in this research because previous research has found that paranormal believers tap into both cognitive styles (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005). Upon investigating the relationship between the cognitive styles, a bias called Left-Brain; Right-Brain Mania (Gazzaniga, 1985) was discovered. This is defined as a bias in Western culture towards rational cognition and the suppression of the intuitive or creative cognitive style (Farthing, 1992). This potential bias seems to be a stumbling block toward finding a more useful balance and validation of both the rational and intuitive cognitive styles. Therefore, this research explored the relationship between the two major cognitive styles and the importance of the balance between the two and of which cognitive style paranormal belief may be a function. In order to find and create a balance between the two cognitive styles it was necessary to also focus on a larger problem of breaking down the cultural bias toward one type of cognition over another.

The Two Major Cognitive Styles

Cognition has been reduced to two major components or cognitive styles by many different researchers (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996; Gardner, 1985; Klinger, 1978-79; Hilgard, 1962; Langer, 1963; Freud, 1900/1965) and has been termed differently depending on the researcher. For example, Freud (1900/1965) distinguished between primary and secondary thought processes: Primary was considered to be more intuitive, imaginative, instinctual and full of vivid wish fulfillment. Secondary was considered to be more rational, controlled, verbal, and oriented toward reality. Suzanne Langer (1963) argued for a difference between presentational and representational intelligence. Presentational intelligence represented the artistic, introspective, and the emotional aspect. Representational intelligence was thus described as being related to language, math, linear learning where there is only one answer to a given question. Hilgard (1962) distinguished between a realistic versus impulsive thinking style. The two types of thinking have also been referred to as intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational (Epstein et al., 1996) and were thought to be tapped through associative judgement strategies and rule based systems respectively (Barbey & Sloman, 2007). Nisbett, Peng, Choi and Norenzayan (2001) referred to the two cognitive styles as analytic and holistic.

            Gardner (1985) also did extensive research on different cognitive styles and came to the conclusion that there are multiple intelligences. He distinguished between verbal, math, movement skills, and spatial, musical skill, insight about the self, and insight about others. These could theoretically, but not completely be separated by cerebral hemisphere. The split between the functioning of the two hemispheres is not as black and white as the researchers had once hoped, but there are trends of relative specialization. For example, the primary, presentational, intuitive, spatial, musical and insight talents occur more in the right brain or right hemisphere; whereas the secondary, representational, rational, realistic, verbal and mathematical skills occur more in the left hemisphere. Split-brain research has not only shown us that both hemispheres are conscious, but that the different hemispheres of the brain do have salient talents that differ (Farthing, 1992).

No matter the term used, the definition and the function of these two cognitions remain similar to the point that the researchers seem to be talking about the same two concepts. For the purpose of this research these cognitive styles will be referred to as rational and intuitive. Rational representing the primary, representational, realistic, analytic, verbal, mathematical, “left-brain” or slower processing, and intuitive being the secondary, presentational, impulsive, experiential, holistic, gut feeling, creativity, “right-brain” and emotional intelligence involved with quicker processing. But what exactly is the relationship between rational and intuitive cognitive styles? The previous research mentioned above did not look at the two cognitive styles as one functioning whole. They seemed to explore them as separate, opposite or two distinct aspects. The two major cognitive styles however are in fact parts of the same brain and perhaps should be studied in a more symbiotic manner. Each cognitive style perhaps needed for their individual talents, but both needed as partners working together to create the full human experience.

The Relationship between the Two Major Cognitive Styles

Klinger, (1978/79) suggested that people could lie on a continuum between the two major cognitive styles and argued that dichotomies were too simple to account for individual differences in thought and imagery. His theory suggested that there is no fine line between the two cognitive styles but some people may lie more to the rational end of the continuum and some may lie more on the intuitive side. Therefore there may not be a balanced decision between cognitive styles when it comes to day to day probabilistic interpretation of events and one cognitive style may prevail over another in certain situations and in certain individuals (King, Burton, Hicks & Drigotas, 2007). For example high rational participants use more of a rational cognitive style and high intuitive persons use more of the intuitive cognitive style (King et al., 2007).

Another theory that investigated or helped aid in the understanding of how the two cognitive styles may work together was the Triune Brain. The Triune Brain theory postulated that the brain has layers that have evolved over time and the different parts or layers could be seen in other animals (MacLean, 1990). For example, the oldest part of the brain termed the reptilian brain is in charge of basic needs such as eating, sleeping, breathing and sex. The layer that develops on top of that is the paleomamailian or the limbic system, in charge of emotions. The final layer is the neomamalian brain or the neocortex in charge of intelligence and cognition. The theory stated that we have competing layers in our brain that all influence the way individuals think, feel and act.

The theory explained how individuals can get up to do something then forget what they were doing. The motivation and the emotional aspects of the brain remembered to do something while the cortex had not yet caught up to the idea. It can also potentially explain situational behaviour, why the same person may behave inconsistently from one situation to the next. Even though all these parts make up the brain, they do not always work together. Relating the Triune Brain to the current research, although not consistent with left brain verses right brain, the paleomamalian could represent the creative, emotional or intuitive style and the neomamalian could represent the rational.

From the research stated above it may seem that the types of consciousness can work as separate entities, and the relationship between them is black and white, left and right or formed by evolutionary steps. Although it is convenient for research sake, to break down the brain into its simplest components for study, this is not always the case.  In psychology it is more commonly accepted that all parts of the brain are so integrated that they work as a “unified whole” and become emergent as the different layers of neural processes come together (Hunt, 1995). So the relationship between the cognitive styles is completely simultaneous and integrated. There are certain parts of the brain that show denser interconnections than other parts in the brain (Hunt, 1995) that are not consistent with hemispheric specialization or Triune Brain diagrams. Some researchers even say that the reptilian part of the brain is more advanced, rather than more primitive because of the many interconnections in that area and because damage to that area results in loss of consciousness or coma (Hunt, 1995). This view however, is consistent with the assumption that only humans have consciousness. If all living organisms have consciousness, then it would make sense that the reptilian brain would be involved in basic consciousness.

The research that focuses on these “zones of convergence” is interested in the localization of function in the brain and strives to find where exactly in the brain these functions occur. This would bring us more into neuropsychology per se and away from cognition and personality of which this paper is a focus. It does, however remind us that cognition is very complex and there are many different theories and definitions that try to explain its functioning and the relationship between cognitive styles. What one generation divides to label and understand, the next generation will unify and so on (Hunt, 1995). Now may be the time to unify the various parts of the brain into one simultaneous conglomeration and to appreciate all the talents the brain can offer. This can lead to the discovery of a balance between all cognitive styles which may be more important than treating them as separate entities.       

Research on Balancing the Two Cognitive Styles

Research investigating the balance between the two cognitive styles had found an imbalance between the rational and emotional cognitive styles to be unhealthy and can lead to problematic conditions, such as Male Normative Alexithymia (Levant, Cook, Smalley, Good, O’Neil, Owen, & Richmond, 2006). Male Normative Alexithymia is when men have trouble understanding or communicating their emotions due to the socialization of gender stereotypes, i.e. “men don’t cry.” Symptoms include difficulty understanding and describing emotion, lack of imagination and extreme pursuit of status and achievement. The “Rubber-band” syndrome is when the emotion builds up from being suppressed and can come out as misdirected anger and violence. If emotion gets suppressed for too long, it may result in what is called the “tin man” symptom, resulting in a person who is no longer able to feel anything at all. The imbalance between rational and emotional can have dire consequences for relationships. Therefore, problematic conditions and loss of relationships can occur from an imbalance between rational and emotional cognitive styles and could provide support for the importance of the equal validation of both rational and intuitive cognitive styles.  

Another view of the need for balance between the two cognitive styles came from Freud (1856-1939). He discussed a need for a balance between love and work. If we are too rational and are consumed by work, relationships begin to suffer. But, if we are too consumed by relationships and are always out partying with friends and family, work life suffers. The idea of a balanced relationship between love and work may also provide support for the importance of equal validation between rational and intuitive cognitive styles because the rational portion of our cognition aids in work and the intuitive style enables relationships to flourish, both of which are important for survival and good health. Therefore, the balance between the two cognitive styles is important not only on an individual level, it is important for relationships as well.  

Are Rational and Emotional Cognitive Styles Considered Equal?

Upon researching the relationship between the cognitive styles, a bias termed Left-Brain; Right-Brain Mania was discovered. This is defined as a bias in Western culture toward the rational cognitive style and the suppression of the creative and emotional as reflected in education, and emphasis still found in public schools (Farthing, 1992). It has also been stated by Hunt and Popham (1987) that intuitive style of cognition is deemed as primitive only because culture believes it to be true. A bias in Western culture toward one cognitive style over another could act as a stumbling block toward a more objective equal validation of rational and intuitive cognitive styles.

Western culture is not the only culture to have bias toward a particular cognitive style. For example Shamanistic societies and First Nations cultures such as the Makiritare, Ojibwa and the Anishinabe revere and develop the intuitive cognitive style over the rational due to their emphasis on dreams and ritual (Tedlock, 2004; Guss, 1980). It is often assumed by psychology that all adults think in the same manner but it has been found that East Asians are more holistic in thinking and Westerners are more analytic (Nisbett, et al., 2001), thus showing that an imbalance between rational and intuitive cognitive styles is also on a cultural level.

Given there is a bias towards the rational in Western society, the present research aims to provide more evidence for the importance of equal validation between rational and intuitive cognitive styles and the need for their balance. In order to find and maintain a balance between rational and intuitive forces however, it may be necessary to attempt to shift the old mentality that one way of thinking is superior, to a more egalitarian approach. In order to provide support for the need for balance of the cognitive styles, and to study the relationship between them, it was necessary to find a form of cognition that might tap into both the rational and the intuitive.

Research on Paranormal Belief 

Research on paranormal belief could be optimal in studying this relationship between the two cognitive styles. Paranormal belief is a high correlate of the intuitive cognitive style (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005), and many researchers have also found poor probabilistic reasoning in paranormal believers (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Wiseman & Watt, 2006; Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985). Probabilistic reasoning is a correlate of rational cognitive style, thus paranormal belief was used as a dependant variable because according to previous research paranormal believers tap differentially into both cognitive styles (a positive correlate of intuitive style and a negative correlate of the rational style).

Much paranormal belief research is devoted to finding a specific characteristic or mechanism that best predicts paranormal belief, including which cognitive style it might pertain to. Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) were first to report a lack of probabilistic reasoning, taken as a general cognitive deficit. Subsequent research on probabilistic reasoning in paranormal believers often postulated paranormal belief as a function of poor rational cognitive abilities. Meanwhile, other research has focused more positively on paranormal belief as a function of high intuitive cognitive style (King, et al. 2007; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

            Paranormal belief as a function of poor rational cognitive style. Research by Blackmore & Troscianko (1985) began the debate about whether paranormal believers have a deficit in rational cognitive style, more specifically, probabilistic reasoning. In her research she found that those who believe in the paranormal were more likely to significantly underestimate the probabilities of multiple events. This effect she termed the “chance base-line shift.” The rationale was that paranormal believers may be misinterpreting chance events as something more than mere coincidence due to faulty reasoning ability. For example, errors in judgement which arose from not knowing the actual chance of events led believers to interpret these events as more extraordinary than they really are, and so as paranormal in nature.

Paranormal belief has been operationally defined as a belief in an anomalous communication without using any known communicative mechanism (Bem & Honorton, 1994; Roberts & Seager, 1999). Paranormal events include experiences variously termed clairvoyance, telepathy, telekinesis and synchronicity. Jung (1960) defined synchronicity as ostensible coincidences that are felt to have a deep personal meaning. The idea that paranormal believers were misinterpreting chance events as something more than mere coincidence is what led researchers to test probabilistic reasoning in those high in paranormal belief (Wiseman & Watt, 2006; Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985). 

Wiseman and Watt (2006) termed this misinterpretation of the chance levels of normal events as paranormal the “misattribution hypothesis,” defined as “misattributed psychic causation to normal experiences” (p. 326). The misattribution is said to be attributed to four processes, but two are of interest to this research: probability misjudgments and a general cognitive deficit. Some research has shown that those who believe in the paranormal do show poor probabilistic reasoning skills (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Wiseman & Watt, 2006; Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985), but other studies have failed to replicate the findings and at least one study reported opposite findings (Wiseman & Watt, 2006).

Roberts and Seager (1999) tested probabilistic reasoning and also domain specific or conditional reasoning scores in high and low paranormal believers. Perhaps a tendency toward paranormal belief is situational or is used in particular circumstances. They found that the domain specific reasoning scores did correlate with paranormal belief, but the probabilistic reasoning scores did not. Therefore they concluded that there may be more to paranormal belief than just low probabilistic reasoning and there may be a specific situation or domain where paranormal belief is used more than another. This research intends to discover a particular cognitive style used in day to day situations that may instigate paranormal belief over a more rational, or probabilistic cognitive style.  

Research on paranormal belief as a general cognitive deficit is even more inconclusive, and overall fails to support the general deficit hypothesis (Wiseman & Watt, 2006; Roberts & Seager, 1999). A possible explanation for this view of a general cognitive deficit could be the influence of the bias in Western culture towards the rational cognitive style. Many of these experiments used I.Q tests as a measure of a participant’s cognitive ability. This is problematic because I.Q tests only tap into the rational cognitive style and fail to measure intuitive or creative talents. The creative and intuitive talents thus go unnoticed and under appreciated. A measure that taps into only one side or aspect of cognition (the rational) cannot be used to determine a general cognitive deficit. This could be more support for a bias in Western culture that could be leaking though into the testing situation.    

Paranormal belief as a function of intuitive cognitive style. Pacini and Epstein (1999) examined the relationship between rational and intuitive cognitive styles in regard to the ratio-bias effect. The ratio-bias effect is when individuals show poor probabilistic reasoning in low probability events. They found errors were more likely made when ratios became larger, or the numbers used in the ratios became higher. For example, the task involved trays of the same or varying ratio of jellybeans and the participant had to pick between the two trays to win a prize. One tray would contain ten jellybeans, one black and nine orange, and the other tray would have 100, ten black and 90 orange. It has been found that participants would more often choose the tray with the larger amount of winning jellybeans, even though the odds were the same. It was also found that participants were also more likely to choose the trays with the larger amount even when the odds were worse. In fact, the ratio-bias effect was independent of differences in paranormal belief.

Intuitive cognitive style may have been influencing the ratio-bias phenomenon based on general impressions of figure-ground relationships in the test (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which would fit best with an intuitive cognitive style. When choosing between trays of varying ratios of jellybeans, participants also tended to misjudge when larger numbers were presented, which would also fit with a more holistic style compared to the greater precision encouraged by smaller numbers (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Also, frequency information is more easily attended to and has been said to prevail over rational cognition (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

The ratio-bias effect is accordingly more likely due to the holistic nature of intuitive cognitive processing, than a simple deficit in a rational cognitive style (King et al., 2007; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Epstein, et al., 1996). Experiments investigating the relationship between paranormal belief and incentive levels found that priming participants with videos evoking happiness led participants to interpret normal events as more paranormal in nature (King et al., 2007). This finding is in line with research investigating stereotype categories. For example, it was found by Forgas and Fiedler (1996) that when participants were primed to be in a happy mood, they were more likely to use stereotypes. These findings were both explained by the heuristic processing of the intuitive cognitive style. Research done by Epstein et al. (1996) found that those who are higher in intuitive thinking style tend to process information more heuristically than those who have a higher need for cognition.

Habit formation and automatic processing such as more global, stereotyped, and gestalt patterns are a function of the intuitive cognitive style and has been said to be a default mode that individuals may revert to when judging certain events (King et al., 2007). Intuitive thinking and processing is fast and automatic (King et al., 2007) explaining why in some situations the rational cognitive mode may be overridden by the faster, intuitive default mode. Thus, suggesting that paranormal interpretations are due to the holistic nature of intuitive cognitive style, rather than a deficit in the rational style.

Paranormal interpretations of events depend on the accumulation of personal experience (King et al., 2007), and individual differences in judgments of events occur according to the perspective that individual has adopted (Epstein et al., 1996), especially if the participant believes they have an emotional connection to paranormal events (King et al., 2007).  Intuitive thinking was found by Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) to be one of the best predictors in differentiating between skeptics and paranormal believers.

In summing up the research on paranormal belief, it does appear that paranormal belief may be more of a function of high intuitive thinking rather than a deficit in rational thought or a general cognitive deficit. Paranormal beliefs are common and pervasive and persist in the face of rational, scientific research and could therefore represent a broad human tendency (King et al., 2007). Perhaps due to the bias in Western culture towards the rational, these paranormal interpretations of events have been dismissed and seen as a deficit or dysfunction in reasoning. Perhaps the paranormal interpretation of events is not a dysfunction, but a normal part of psychological functioning (King et al., 2007), especially if errors in judgment such as the ratio-bias effect occur in all participants regardless of their belief in the paranormal. If erroneous probabilistic judgment is due to a shift to a default mode which all people possess, then the tendency is so strong that everyone will experience it and it will not differentiate between paranormal believers and non-believers. Thus, a conclusion that paranormal belief is a function of a general cognitive deficit may be faulty because the deficit occurs in both rationally and intuitively dominant people (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

The research in this paper provides evidence that paranormal belief is more a function of high intuitive thinking style, rather than a deficit in rational thought, and provides support for an ideal balance between the two cognitive styles. If happiness evoking videos can affect probability judgment, then perhaps priming one cognitive style could affect scores on tasks measuring the other cognitive style. Perhaps an individual’s dominant cognitive style could affect proper utilization of the other cognitive style. Therefore it was hypothesized that:

1. If paranormal believers are higher in intuitive thinking, rather than deficient in rational cognition, then high scores on creative or intuitive measures would predict paranormal belief more efficiently than low scores in rational thinking or probabilistic reasoning tasks.
2. If one dominant cognitive style can affect proper utilization of the other cognitive style if primed, then scores on tasks measuring the other cognitive style will be affected.

Method

Participants

            A sample of female Brock University undergraduate students (N = 164) participated in the experiment. The ages ranged from 18 - 54 (M = 19) and all signed up for the experiment through the Brock on-line psychology research pool web site. Participants were recruited through posters and up to ten participants were run at a time in each condition.

Measures

            Questionnaires. There were five separate questionnaires: The shortened version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (R.E.I) by Epstein, et al., (1996), consisted of ten items, five measuring rational cognitive style and five measuring intuitive cognitive style, were measured on a scale of one to five, with high scores indicating higher levels of cognitive style. The Paranormal Belief Scale (taken directly from Glicksohn, 1990, who adapted it from Irwin, 1985b; Neppe, 1983; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), was used as a dependent variable, to measure the degree of openness to paranormal phenomena. There were ten items measured on a scale of one to five, with high scores indicating higher degree of belief. Imagination, absorption, a correlate of paranormal belief and intuitive states was measured with the Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). It contained 34 items, measured on a scale of one to five, with high scores indicating greater levels of absorption. The Individualistic vs. Collectivist World View Questionnaire (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) was used as filler for the control group in lieu of an intuitive versus rational prime. It contained 16 items (eight measured individualistic world view and eight measured collectivistic world view). A new measure was introduced, developed by the authors; the Hunt-Kroeker Novelty Questionnaire, (2007) which measured surprise, interest and how subjectively improbable the participants perceived ordinary and non-ordinary events to be. The rationale behind the scale was to see if it would predict that people high in openness to paranormal activity would be less surprised by strange events and more surprised by normal events than those who are more rational. It was developed to see if a cognitive style oriented to novelty could be found when judging day to day events or if it could differentiate between the rational and intuitive cognitive styles. It was also developed to see if it would be a strong predictor of belief in the paranormal. The questionnaire contained 16 items and consisted of two types of events, normal and paranormal. Sample items included [“Someone tells you that their car is exactly the same colour as their house”] a) how surprising do you find this statement, b) how interesting do you find this statement c) how improbable do you find this statement, and [“Someone tells you that the night before, they saw a UFO”] a) how surprising do you find this statement, b) how interesting do you find this statement c) how improbable do you find this statement. Degree of surprise, interest and perceived improbability were measured on a 6-point scale from (0) “not at all surprising/interesting/improbable” to (5) “completely surprising/interesting/improbable”. The questionnaire has been appended as Part B. A 6-point scale was used to force the participant to one side of the scale or the other. Items 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 were normal events and items 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 represented paranormal events.   

Tasks

 There were three tasks involved in the experiment: The ratio-bias test was used as a prime in the rational prime group. A probabilistic reasoning task was used as a measure of the rational cognitive style, and a Tarot ratings task measured Jung’s tendency to synchronicity experience as an indicator of creativity or intuitive cognitive ability.

Task procedure

Ratio-bias test. The ratio bias test included six wooden boxes filled with varying ratios of jellybeans. Box one had a ratio of 1:10 and the participants had to choose between box one of 1:10 and box two, which changed from being either 10:100, 9:100, 7:100, 5:100, to 3:100. Black being the lesser value in each ratio, the participants were asked which box they would rather pick from if picking a black jellybean gave them a prize. This task was used as the prime in the rational prime group, and the participants were told after completion of the task that they would be surprised at how many people pick box two with 10:100 over box one of 1:10 even though the odds are the same. The researcher went on to say that they would be even more surprised at how many people pick the 9:100 and the 7:100 even though the odds are worse. This was thought to shift the participant’s cognitive style to favour rational thinking. This idea was based on Pacini and Epstein (1999) as they had found that the ratio-bias test produces a conflict between rational and intuitive thinking styles, and those who are more rationally minded tend to shift their judgment and behaviour in a more rational direction.

Probabilistic reasoning task. The probabilistic reasoning task involved the participants looking at two jars filled with jelly beans (Jar A and Jar B). In Jar A there were 85 orange jellybeans and 15 black jellybeans. In Jar B there was the same proportion, but reversed in colour (85 black jellybeans and 15 orange). The participants were told the experimenter had jars under the table containing the exact proportions of the jellybeans in the jars they see on top of the table. The participants were then told there was going to be two conditions, and in each condition a jar would be randomly chosen. After the jar selection was made, jellybeans were then randomly picked from that jar. The task was they had to guess which jar the jellybeans were picked from. For each selection the participants were to circle the jar they believed to be the one (Jar A or Jar B) and report how sure they were with their answer on the sheet provided (0%, 25%, 50%, 85%, 100%). The experimenter then picked out 20 jellybeans, leaving time after each jellybean selection for the participants to record their answers. However, the picking was not at random and there was only one jar under the experimenter’s table with enough jellybeans to complete a preordained order for each condition. The order for each condition was as follows:

   Condition 1

   A   A   A   B   A   A   A   A   A   B   B   A   A   A   A   A   A   A  A  B

 

   Condition 2

 

   A   A   A   B   A   A   B   A   B   A   B   B   B   B   B   B   B   B   A   B

 

 This task was taken from an experiment done by Garety, Hemsley, and Wessly (1991) and the criteria of assessing the results were based as close as possible on the criteria specified in the article.

Scoring of the probabilistic reasoning task. The scores were classified by probabilistic reasoning skills using six categories of skill range. “Excellent skills” were judged by the point at which they switched their percentage of how sure they were to 100%. If they were 100% sure around the tenth or eleventh selection and if they continued to be 100% sure of their answer and guessed the correct jar in the end they showed excellent probability reasoning. If they were 100% sure of their decision before it was truly possible to know exactly which jar the jellybeans were coming from, they were placed in a lower category of “great skills” if the correct jar was also selected in the end. If the percentages never reached 100% at the end but they picked the correct jar, the participant was thought to be unsure and therefore not as rational minded as the other two groups and were placed in the “good skills” pile. Those whose percentages were all over the place and did not make much sense, but picked the correct jar were judged as have “fair skills”. Those who did not pick the correct jar showed “poor skills” and the last category was for those whose choices made no sense at all or maybe did not understand the task. Higher scores represented higher probabilistic reasoning skills. This was done for both conditions and averaged together for a total probabilistic reasoning score. 

Tarot Representativeness Task. Presented after the intuitive, neutral, or rational primes, a deck of Tarot cards was shuffled three times for each group and spread across the table. Certain cards however were removed from the deck before the experiment took place. These cards included the tower, the hanged man, the devil and the death card as not to offend or make the participants uneasy. The participants were told to select two cards from the deck, one at a time. The person on the right was always selected to pick first to keep it consistent. The participants were told that they would not be told the standard meanings of the cards and it was up to them to use their own interpretation.

Once they had selected two cards each from the deck, knowing which card they had picked first, they returned to their stations and turned over the sheet that asked them to rate how representative the cards were to their experience or inner self at the time. They were to circle the appropriate rating of the card on a scale of one to five, (1) “nothing like my experience or self” to (5) “exactly like my experience or self”. The participants were then instructed to write a short paragraph about why and how the cards did or did not represent their experience or inner self at the time.

Scoring of the Tarot Task. Their ratings for each card were averaged as a quantitative Tarot score and the written paragraphs were qualitatively rated for creativity. Previous research has shown that the Tarot task is a valid measure of openness to experience, and metaphoric ability, both correlating highly with creativity, absorption and intuitive thinking style (Hunt & Popham, 1987). The qualitative scores were coded by Dr. Hunt, blind to experimental group primes. However, the quantitative measure was so strongly related to the qualitative ratings that it alone was used as the final Tarot score.

Procedure

            Each participant sat down in front of a folder. Inside the folder were consent forms, questionnaires and task sheets. After they read and signed the consent forms, the participants were then told to keep gestures, talking and other verbal reactions to themselves so as not to influence the others in the room. Their group assignments, the rational prime, intuitive prime or the control, were determined before they came to the room. The groups were selected by random assignment as much as possible, but in order to get an equal amount of participants in each group, sometimes the group was determined by the number of participants needed in that group.

Each group filled out the same questionnaires and participated in the same tasks, but the order in which the tasks were performed and the questionnaires were completed depended on the group they were in. For each group, the Tarot task was fifth item in the list of tasks and questionnaires, following the prime. Thus each group completed four activities (questionnaires and a task, or just questionnaires) before participating in the Tarot task. At the end of each session, the participants were thanked and given debriefing information. Each session lasted 30 minutes to an hour. 

Rational Prime Procedure

The rational prime group first filled out the R.E.I, the Hunt-Kroeker Novelty Questionnaire, followed by the Paranormal Belief Scale, before participating in their prime, the ratio-bias test. The Tarot task followed, then the probabilistic reasoning task, the Tellegen Absorption Scale, ending with the World View Questionnaire.

Intuitive Prime Group Procedure

The intuitive prime group first filled out the R.E.I, the Hunt-Kroeker Novelty Questionnaire, followed by the Paranormal Belief Scale, before participating in their prime which was the Tellegen Absorption Scale. Their Tarot task was then followed by the probabilistic reasoning task, the ratio bias test and ending with the World View Questionnaire.

Control Group Procedure

The control group went through the same process, but in the following order: R.E.I, the Novelty Questionnaire, the Paranormal Belief Scale, World View Questionnaire, Tarot Activity, Probabilistic Reasoning Task, Tellegen Absorption Scale, and lastly the ratio-bias test.

Results

            All variables were normally distributed (the mean, median and mode were all quite equal) with the exception of the absorption scores (M = 19.65, median = 20.00, mode = 17, SD = 5.70). Therefore, analyses using the absorption variable should be interpreted with caution. Two ANOVAs were conducted to test the hypothesis that priming one cognitive style would affect scores on tasks measuring another cognitive style (Levene’s analysis of variance was non-significant for all variables). A two way ANOVA (group by condition) was conducted to determine if there was a difference among the means in the Tarot representativeness scores (quantitative average). The result of this ANOVA was non-significant. Therefore, there were no significant differences among the groups on the intuitive measure [F (2, 160 = .53, p = .482].

            Another two way ANOVA (group by condition) was conducted to determine the if there were differences among means in the rational measure using the probabilistic reasoning scores.  This analysis was significant [F (2,160) = 4.33, p = .015]. A post hoc analysis (Bonferroni) unexpectedly showed the intuitive prime group (M = 4.19, SD = 1.25) scoring significantly higher than the control group on the probabilistic reasoning task (M = 3.54, SD = 1.12).

A correlational analysis was conducted to determine the highest correlates of the dependant variable of paranormal belief (N = 164, M = 26.41, SD = 7.66) to test the hypothesis that paranormal belief is more of a function of high intuitive cognition rather than deficient rational cognition. There was a significant positive correlation between paranormal belief and the Tarot average [r (163) = .38, p < .0001] indicating that higher paranormal beliefs are associated with more positive responses on the Tarot task. There was also a significant positive correlation between paranormal belief and absorption [M = 19.65, SD = 5.70, r (162) = .30, p = .007]. So, in line with previous research the higher the paranormal belief, the more absorbed the participant becomes when watching movies, sunsets or reading books. A significant negative correlation was found between paranormal belief and the improbability average such that the more improbable the participant judged events to be, the less likely they were to believe in the paranormal [r (164) = -.26, p = .001]. A significant positive correlation was found between paranormal belief and the REI-Intuitive measure [r (164) = .22, p = .004]. Thus, the higher the paranormal belief, the higher the participant was in intuitive cognitive style. Upon further examination it was discovered that items on the novelty questionnaire that pertained to how improbable the participants perceived events to be were the paranormal events, significantly but inversely correlating with paranormal belief [r (164) = -.40, p < .0001]. The REI rational score did not correlate with the probability average [r (163) = -.01, p = .927] and the score measuring how improbable the participants judged events to be did not correlate significantly with their actual probabilistic reasoning scores [r (163) = .09, p = .280]. However, when the improbability items were broken down into normal and paranormal events, the perceived improbability of paranormal events did significantly correlate with the REI-rational scores [r (164) = -.16, p = .046]. So, the more rational the participant was, the more improbable he or she judged paranormal events to be. Age was also found to be a significant correlate of paranormal belief [r (163) = .17, p = .031], in that the older participants scored higher in paranormal belief than the younger participants. All other correlations were non-significant. 

A hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis that intuitive measures predict paranormal belief more efficiently than rational measures. The regression analysis was conducted in two steps to see how much variance in paranormal belief could be predicted by rational measures (step one) and how much additional variance could be accounted for by intuitive measures (step two). The criterion of paranormal belief in step one was regressed by two variables or predictors: Probabilistic reasoning scores and REI-rational scores. The criterion of paranormal belief in step 2 was regressed by three variables or predictors: Tarot average scores, absorption scores and REI-intuitive scores. All assumptions were met on all variables and the variables were independent because the Durbin Watson test was within acceptable range [DW (3,155) = 1.91, p < .0001]. See Table 1 for correlations regarding regression analysis and Table 2 for the regression analysis.

It was found that the rational measures accounted for 2% of the variance and were non-significant [F (2,158) = 1.56, p = .241]. However, the intuitive measures significantly predicted paranormal belief and accounted for 21% of the variance [F (5,155) = 8.97, p < .0001]. The regression analysis was conducted again using only the significant intuitive measures. The regression equation for predicting paranormal belief from intuitive measures such as tarot representativeness scores, absorption and REI-Intuitive scores is as follows:

Paranormal belief = 9.79 (2.00) Tarot average + 0.31 (absorption) + 0.27 (REI-intuitive).

            Internal validity correlations for the Hunt-Kroeker Novelty Questionnaire showed that the paranormal and normal event items were significantly correlated [r (164) = .25, p = .001] suggesting that the normal and the paranormal event items were not truly measuring separate categories of events. However, the split half reliability correlations (Cronbach’s alpha) for the surprise, interest and improbability items were high enough to be acceptable (surprise, α = .74; interest, α = .73; and improbability, α = .69), thus the questionnaire showed good internal reliability.

Improbability scores did not correlate with REI rational [r (164) = -.08, p = .933] or REI intuitive scores [r (164) = -.09, p = .265]. Therefore, judging the probability of every day events was not related to either cognitive style using the Novelty questionnaire.

The participant’s subjective ratings of how surprising events were, significantly and positively correlated with normal [r (164) = .60, p < .0001] and paranormal [r (164) = .65, p < .0001] events suggesting that both the normal and the paranormal events were equally surprising to the individuals. Therefore, a particular cognitive style oriented towards novelty was not found by using this questionnaire. REI intuitive scores did not correlate with total surprise [r (164) = .07, p = .393], surprise to normal events [r (164) = .07, p = .393] or paranormal events [r (164) = .04, p = .596]. REI rational scores did not correlate with total surprise [r (164) = -.00, p = .968], surprise to normal [r (164) = .09, p = .267] or paranormal events [r (164) = -.09, p = .271]. Therefore, the Novelty questionnaire did not differentiate between the rational or intuitive cognitive styles.

Total surprise did not correlate with paranormal belief [r (164) = .11, p = .168] nor did surprise to normal events correlate with paranormal belief [r (164) = .12, p = .139] or to surprise toward paranormal events [r (164) = .06, p = .449]. Therefore, the new measure did not predict the dependent variable as well as traditional measures.

Discussion

Results of all analyses showed that previous findings that paranormal believers do poorly on probabilistic reasoning tasks were not replicated, in fact this research can be placed in the category of research that has found opposite finds. Support was found for the hypothesis that paranormal belief is more of a function of high intuitive cognition rather than a deficit of rational cognition, because the multiple regression analysis showed that the intuitive measures significantly predicted paranormal belief and the rational measures did not. Low scores on rational measures such as poor probabilistic reasoning or high REI rational scores did not predict paranormal belief compared to the intuitive measures such as Tarot average, absorption and REI-intuitive scores. Therefore, support was found that paranormal belief is more of a function of high intuitive thinking rather than a function of poor rational or probabilistic reasoning skills. Poor probabilistic skills were not found in those high in paranormal belief and goes against previous interpretations of findings that those who are high in paranormal belief are deficient in rational thinking or probabilistic reasoning. There was also no evidence for a general cognitive deficit because the intuitively primed group did significantly better, rather than worse on the probabilistic reasoning task and the participants’ paranormal belief scores were not related to their probabilistic reasoning scores.

There did seem to be some support for the notion that domain specific cognition could be at work when judging the probability of day to day events, even though the improbability ratings did not correlate significantly to either cognitive style. It may be that individuals revert to their default mode and use their intuitive cognition in daily circumstances rather than their rational thought because the participant’s scores that measured how improbable events were, and their actual probability reasoning scores did not correlate. This could suggest that the improbability judgement may have been more of a function of intuitive cognitive style, rather than a dysfunction of the rational. However, there may be a different cognitive style influencing the judgement of day to day events altogether because the REI-rational and the REI-intuitive scores did not correlate with subjective improbability ratings. Thus, the Novelty questionnaire did not find a particular cognitive style towards novelty, every day events nor differentiate between rational and intuitive cognitive styles or predict the dependent variable as well as traditional measures. A more sensitive questionnaire is needed to parse out a particular cognitive style oriented to every day events in the future.   

In regard to the hypothesis that one’s dominant cognitive style would affect proper utilization of the other cognitive style, support was mixed. Priming one cognitive style did affect scores on tasks measuring the other, but only in the intuitive group and only on the probabilistic reasoning measure and not in the direction hypothesized. It was believed that priming the participants to be in an intuitive cognitive style, would result in low scores on the probabilistic reasoning task, when in fact the intuitively primed participants scored significantly higher than the control group.

A possible explanation for this increase, rather than decrease in performance could be that perhaps the participants were bombarded by so much uncomfortable or unfamiliar stimuli that they boosted their rational cognition to compensate. This makes sense because if there is a bias in Western culture it would be to deny and suppress paranormal explanations and revere rational explanations. This could also be a plausible explanation because the intuitive prime group was exposed to the Novelty questionnaire, the paranormal belief scale, the absorption questionnaire, and then participated in the Tarot task, all of which contain stimuli pertaining to the paranormal.

Another possible explanation (post-hoc) for the opposite findings in hypothesis two is that the bombardment of the intuitive stimuli may have saturated the participant’s intuitive thinking so much that an after-effect of rational cognition resulted. An after-effect is a term used to describe visual phenomena produced in the receptors of the eye (after effects occur due to the antagonistic organization of the receptors in the eye). For example if a person stares at a waterfall for 30 seconds then looks away at a neutral surface, a movement in the opposite direction as the waterfall is perceived. Likewise for staring at a red piece of paper for 30 seconds, when the person looks away at a neutral or white surface, the opposite or complimentary colour of green is perceived.

Perhaps our cognitive styles could also be antagonistically organized so that the saturation of one is possible. It could explain why recess is needed at school, and breaks are needed at work. It could explain why one cannot sit and write a 30 page thesis all in one sitting, the rational cognitive style becomes saturated and the intuitive cognitive style overrides the rational by reverting back to a default mode.

The bias in Western society inhibits the idea that opposing forces can be compliments. If one cognitive style is considered superior, then the potential balance between the two may not be easily found. If problematic conditions such as Male Normative Alexithymia can result from an imbalance between the two cognitive styles, then it is important to understand the importance of equal validation between rational and intuitive cognitive styles and to find a balance between them. It is erroneous to believe one cognitive style is better than the other because there is no evidence to support the claim that rational thinking is superior to intuitive. The two styles work together and their talents can be utilized in different situations, the rational is more useful in a work or school setting, and the intuitive is more valuable for relationships and recreational settings. Thus both cognitive styles are necessary and should be developed as equals.

Limitations and Future directions

Using a sample of only university students has its limitations because it has been shown that university students tend to have lower levels of paranormal belief (Roberts & Seager, 1999). Women, however have been shown to report higher levels of paranormal belief than men (Wilson & French, 2006), therefore the sample in the current study was all female in hopes to counter-balance the findings of low paranormal belief among university students.

Another draw back in using university participants was that age was found to be a significant predictor in paranormal belief. The older participants were more likely to believe in the paranormal. A university sample implies a younger group of participants and the mean age in this study was 19; not old enough to predict paranormal belief through age. Also, younger participants have not experienced enough in their lifetimes to make decisions based on their own direct experience. Also, a young university sample may be too rational for optimal research on paranormal belief.

Previous research has also suggested that investigations of the relationship between paranormal belief and probabilistic reasoning should use more participants that are higher on paranormal belief (Roberts & Seager, 1999). Here, the mean level of paranormal belief was relatively low, as was the mean for absorption, suggesting that the criterion for more participants with higher paranormal belief was not met.

The prime for the intuitive group may not have been strong enough to properly shift participants into an intuitive frame of mind. There is no previous research indicating that the use of the absorption questionnaire alone would result in said shift. Perhaps the questionnaire had the opposite effect, shifting the participants into a more rational mode, rather than an intuitive mode. Perhaps a stem completion task with intuitive or even spiritual items would be a more effective prime.

Feedback from the experiment showed that some participants were aggravated by the ratio-bias test. Participants indicated that they did not enjoy having to choose between ratios of the same odds. Perhaps these participants felt that this test insulted their intelligence. Anger and annoyance were expressed as a result, and in the rational prime group, this test was presented early on in the session. It could be possible that the rational prime group’s performance was affected by the emotion evoked by the ratio-bias test. Emotions such as anger and annoyance may have overridden or hindered the shift to a rational mind set. Another potential problem with the ratio-bias test was that even though Pacini and Epstein (1999) found that the ratio-bias test produces a conflict between rational and intuitive thinking styles, and those who are more rationally minded tend to shift their judgment and behaviour in a more rational direction, it may not have had same effect on the intuitive thinkers.

The scoring of the probabilistic reasoning task was not as close to the criteria specified by Garety, Hemsley and Wessely (1991) as was hoped. The variables involved in deducing high or low probabilistic reasoning were more complex than anticipated. Whether the criteria proposed in this research are more or less accurate than previous criteria remains unknown. Replication of both probabilistic scoring measures and perhaps a more standardized procedure for determining probabilistic reasoning is needed for future research in this area.

Future direction in this area of research may require an older sample, a more standardized test for probabilistic reasoning skills, and the use of stronger primes for both rational and intuitive cognitive styles. More research is also needed to follow up the proposition that rational and intuitive cognitive styles may be antagonistically organized. Any research stressing the importance of the complimentary relationship between the cognitive styles is beneficial towards breaking down the bias towards one cognitive style over another.

 

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Table 1. Pearson correlations among paranormal belief and rational/intuitive measures.

	paranormal    belief	REI-rational	probabilistic average	Tarot average	absorption	REI-intuitive
paranormal belief	_
REI-rational	.10	_
probabilistic average	-.09	-.01	_
Tarot average	.38**	.03	-.11	_
absorption	.30**	.17*	-.03	.21**	_
REI-intuitive	.22**	.02	-.06	.26**	.15	_

*p < .05, ** p < .01, two-tailed.

 

 

Table 2: Regression coefficients and tests of significance in predicting paranormal belief using rational measures (probabilistic reasoning, REI-rational) and intuitive measures (tarot, absorption, REI-intuitive).

Step	Variable	B	β	sr²	t	p	R²change
	Intercept	23.00
1.rational	Probabilistic	-.60	-.09	-.09	-1.17	.245
	REI-rational	.43	.10	.10	1.31	.192
						.214	.02
2.intuitive	Intercept	7.14
	Tarot score	1.94	.29	.28	3.93	<.0001
	Absorption	.31	.23	.22	3.08	.002
	REIintuitive	.31	.13	.12	1.75	.083
						<.0001	.21